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Prospective strict no-arbitrage and the fundamental theorem of
asset pricing under transaction costs∗
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Abstract
In discrete time markets with proportional transaction costs, Schachermayer [Sch04]
shows that robust no-arbitrage is equivalent to the existence of a strictly consistent price
system.
In this paper, we introduce the concept of prospective strict no-arbitrage that is a vari-
ant of the strict no-arbitrage property from Kabanov, Ra´sonyi, and Stricker [KRS02]. The
prospective strict no-arbitrage condition is slightly weaker than robust no-arbitrage, and it
implies that the set of portfolios attainable from zero initial endowment is closed in prob-
ability. A weak version of prospective strict no-arbitrage turns out to be equivalent to the
existence of a consistent price system. In contrast to the fundamental theorem of asset pric-
ing of Schachermayer [Sch04], the consistent frictionless prices may lie on the boundary of
the bid-ask spread.
On the technical level, a crucial difference to Schachermayer [Sch04] and Kabanov-
Ra´sonyi-Stricker [KRS03] is that we prove closedness without having at hand that the null-
strategies form a linear space.
Keywords: proportional transaction costs, arbitrage, fundamental theorem of asset pricing
JEL classification: G11, G12
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1 Introduction
In frictionless finite discrete time financial market models, the absence of arbitrage opportunities
is equivalent to the existence of an equivalent probability measure under which the discounted
price processes are martingales. This result is called the fundamental theorem of asset pric-
ing (FTAP). In the case of a finite probability space, it goes back to the work of Harrison and
Pliska [HP81]. The extension to arbitrary probability spaces is known as the Dalang-Morton-
Willinger Theorem [DMW90], whose original proof was subsequently refined by several authors,
see, e.g., [Sch92], [KS01a]. In the later proofs, the implication that, in frictionless markets, the
absence of arbitrage opportunities implies that the set of hedgeable claims attainable from zero
endowment is closed in probability is identified as the key lemma.
For a finite probability space, Kabanov and Stricker [KS01b] extend the FTAP of Harrison
and Pliska to models with proportional transaction costs. They consider a general “currency
model” with finitely many currencies (assets), which we also follow in the current paper. It al-
lows to buy any asset by paying with any other asset. In this general framework, there need not
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exist an asset which can play the role of a bank account, i.e., an asset which can be involved in
every transaction at minimal costs. Kabanov and Stricker show that no-arbitrage (NA) is equiv-
alent to the existence of a so-called consistent price system (CPS), which is a multidimensional
martingale under the objective probability measure taking values within the dual of the cone
of solvent portfolios at each point in time. For infinite probability spaces, this equivalence fails:
Schachermayer [Sch04] provides an example for an arbitrage-free market which allows for an
approximate arbitrage and consequently a CPS cannot exist (see Example 3.1 therein). There
arises the obvious question under which stronger no-arbitrage conditions the existence of a CPS
can be guaranteed. Schachermayer [Sch04] introduces the concept of robust no-arbitrage (NAr)
– a no-arbitrage condition which is robust with respect to small changes in the bid-ask spreads.
Loosely speaking, if the bid-ask spread (of a pair of assets) does not vanish, there have to exist
more favorable bid-ask prices, leading to a smaller spread, such that the modified market still
satisfies (NA). Schachermayer shows that (NAr) implies that the set of hedgeable claims attain-
able from zero endowment, in the following denoted by A, is closed in probability, and (NAr)
is equivalent to the existence of a strictly consistent price system (SCPS), that is a martingale
taking values within the relative interior of the dual of the cone of solvent portfolios at each
point in time.
An alternative condition is the strict no-arbitrage (NAs) property introduced by Kabanov,
Ra´sonyi, and Stricker [KRS02]. Loosely speaking, a market model satisfies (NAs) iff any claim
which is attainable from zero endowment up to some intermediate time t and which can be
liquidated in t for sure, can also be attained from zero endowment by trading at time t only.
(NAs) alone does not imply the existence of a CPS (see Example 3.3 in [Sch04] for the existence
of an approximate arbitrage under (NAs)), but together with the Penner-condition this implica-
tion holds (see Penner [Pen01] and Theorem 2 of Kabanov-Ra´sonyi-Stricker [KRS03]). Loosely
speaking, the Penner-condition postulates that any “free-round-trip” of exchanging assets that
can be carried out in the next period for sure – given the information of the current period –
can already be carried out in the current period. Together with (NAs), it allows to show that
the so-called null-strategies, i.e., the increments of self-financing portfolio processes with van-
ishing terminal value, form a linear space. This is also a crucial argument in [Sch04] to show
closedness of A, which is the main step to show the existence of a CPS. Indeed, it is shown by
Rokhlin [Rok08] that the vector space property of null-strategies is equivalent to (NAr).
A different approach to study the occurrence of an approximate arbitrage is followed in Jacka,
Berkaoui, and Warren [JBW08]. They provide a necessary and sufficient condition for A to be
closed in probability and construct adjusted trading prices such that the corresponding cone of
hedgeable claims attainable from zero endowment either contains an arbitrage or corresponds
to the closure of A. Put differently, they postulate the (weak) no-arbitrage condition for an
adjusted trading model instead of postulating a stronger no-arbitrage condition for the original
one (cf. also Remark 4.4 below).
Furthermore, it is important to note that the closedness of A is not necessary for the existence
of a CPS. In the case of only two assets (e.g., a bank account and one risky stock), it is shown
by Grigoriev [Gri05] that (NA) already implies the existence of a CPS – although A need
not be closed (see Example 1.3 in [Gri05] and Proposition 3.5 in Le´pinette and Zhao [LZ]
for the non-closedness of the set of attainable liquidation values). This means that already
in dimension two, additional conditions are required to guarantee that the set of attainable
liquidation values is closed. For this, Le´pinette and Zhao [LZ] provide an intuitive and easy
to verify condition (Condition E) that takes the postponing of trades into consideration. Their
proof uses the existence of a CPS that is guaranteed by Grigoriev [Gri05] in the case of an
arbitrage-free model with two assets. On the other hand, already for three assets, there is a
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counterexample showing that (NA) does not imply the existence of a CPS (see Example 4.6 in
[Ku¨h18]). The goal of the current paper is twofold:
• We want to provide an (easy to interpret) no-arbitrage condition which is as weak as
possible and under which the set A of terminal portfolios attainable from zero endowment
is closed.
• We want to establish a FTAP with CPSs which are not necessarily strict as in the FTAP
of Schachermayer [Sch04].
For this, we introduce a variant of (NAs), that we call prospective strict no-arbitrage (NAps) and
that turns out to be sufficient to guarantee that A is closed in probability (see Theorem 2.5). We
say that the market model satisfies (NAps) iff any claim which is attainable from zero endowment
by trading up to some time t and which can subsequently be liquidated for sure, can also be
attained from zero endowment in the subsequent periods (here, “subsequent” is not understood
in a strict sense). This means that in contrast to the (NAs) criterion, we do not distinguish
between a trade that can be realized at time t and a trade from which we know at time t for
sure that it can be realized in the future. In the special case of efficient friction, (NAps) and
(NAs) are equivalent (see Proposition 2.18).
In our proofs, we cannot rely on the vector space property of the null-strategies, which
was central in the arguments of Schachermayer and Kabanov-Ra´sonyi-Stricker. Indeed, it was
shown by Rokhlin [Rok08] that this property is equivalent to (NAr), which is strictly stronger
than (NAps). Our proof relies on a decomposition of the trading possibilities in “reversible”
and “purely non-reversible” transactions at each point in time, where we call a transaction
“reversible” if the resulting portfolio can be liquidated in the later periods for sure. This decom-
position can be seen as a non-linear, only positively homogeneous generalization of the projection
on the set of null-strategies that is used in the case that the null-strategies form a vector space.
Given a trading strategy, we then consider only the “purely non-reversible” part at each point
in time and postpone the “reversible” part to later points in time, where more information is
available. This is possible by (NAps), and, as it turns out, sufficient to assert that A is closed in
probability. Consequently, (NAps) implies the existence of a CPS.
On the other hand, as described above, a CPS can exist although the set A is not closed.
Consequently, the existence of a CPS cannot be equivalent to (NAps). But, for a weak version of
(NAps), called weak prospective strict no-arbitrage (NAwps), we have equivalence to the existence
of a CPS (see Theorem 2.10). A market satisfies (NAwps) iff there exists an at least as favorable
market which satisfies (NAps). Since the second market need not be strictly more favorable than
the original one, (NAps) implies (NAwps). Hence, we establish a FTAP, which complements those
of Schachermayer [Sch04] and Kabanov-Ra´sonyi-Stricker [KRS02, KRS03]. The main difference
is that the resulting CPS may lie on the relative boundary of the bid-ask-spread. In Section 4,
Figure 1 illustrates a very simple example for this. Alternatively, one may think of an actually
frictionless market that is written as a model with efficient friction in the following way. Each
point in time is split into two points. Under the same information, at the first point, the investor
can only buy, and at the second point she can only sell a stock. If the frictionless market satisfies
(NA), the artificial market with friction has a CPS but not a SCPS. Thus, at least from a
conceptual point of view, it is desirable to have a FTAP with arbitrary CPSs as well.
In the case of a finite probability space, (NAwps) is equivalent to (NA), which means that our
version of the FTAP can be seen as a generalization of the above mentioned FTAP by Kabanov
and Stricker [KS01b] (see part 2 of Theorem 1 therein) to the case of arbitrary probability
spaces. Finally, we motivate the (NAwps) condition by an example which shows that (NAwps)
cannot be replaced by a further weakening of the (NAps) condition (see Example 4.3).
3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the framework
of financial modeling, the prospective strict no-arbitrage condition, and the weak prospective
strict no-arbitrage condition. We relate these properties to the robust no-arbitrage and the strict
no-arbitrage condition and state the main results of the paper (Theorem 2.5 and Theorem 2.10).
The proofs can be found in Section 3. In Section 4, there are two very simple examples that
illustrate the differences between the above mentioned no-arbitrage conditions and a more so-
phisticated example (Example 4.3) that shows the effect of a possible “cascade” of approximate
hedges.
2 Prospective strict no-arbitrage and consistent price systems
We now introduce the market model and the relevant notation. We work on a probability space
(Ω,F ,P) equipped with a discrete time filtration (Ft)
T
t=0, T ∈ N, such that FT = F . The space
(of equivalence classes) of Ft-measurable d-dimensional random vectors is denoted by L
0(Rd,Ft).
For a set-valued mapping ω 7→ N(ω) ⊆ Rd, we denote by L0(N,Ft) := {v ∈ L
0(Rd,Ft) | v(ω) ∈
N(ω) for a.e. ω ∈ Ω} the set of Ft-measurable selectors of N . As usual, the spaces are equipped
with the topology of the convergence in probability, and we write L0(N) := L0(N,FT ).
We work with the market model with proportional transaction costs from Schachermayer [Sch04],
where the reader may find a discussion about its economical meaning and its connection to
the models of [KRS02] and [KS01b]. There are d ∈ N traded assets, and a d × d-matrix
Π = (piij)1≤i,j≤d is called bid-ask matrix if
(i) 0 < piij <∞, for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ d,
(ii) piii = 1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ d,
(iii) piij ≤ piikpikj, for 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ d.
The terms of trade of the d assets are specified by a bid-ask process (Πt)
T
t=0, i.e., an adapted d×d–
matrix-valued process such that for each ω ∈ Ω and t ∈ {0, . . . , T}, Πt(ω) is a bid-ask matrix.
For each t ∈ {0, . . . , T}, the random matrix Πt = (pi
ij
t )1≤i,j≤d specifies the exchanges available
to the investor at time t. More precisely, the entry piijt denotes the number of units of asset i for
which an agent can buy one unit of asset j at time t. Therefore, the set of portfolios attainable at
zero endowment at time t, which, in this context, consists of Ft-measurable R
d-valued random
variables, is modeled by the convex cone ∑
1≤i,j≤d
λij(ej − piijt e
i)− r
∣∣∣∣(λij)1≤i,j≤d ∈ L0(Rd×d+ ,Ft), r ∈ L0(Rd+,Ft)
 , (2.1)
where ei denotes the i-th unit vector of Rd. This means that each portfolio is the result of
an order λ = (λij)1≤i,j≤d ∈ L
0(Rd×d+ ,Ft), where λ
ij denotes the units of assets j ordered in
exchange for asset i, and some non-negative amount r ∈ L0(Rd+,Ft), which corresponds to the
decision of the investor to “throw away” some non-negative quantities of each assets. Next, we
define for each ω ∈ Ω the polyhedral cone
−K(Πt(ω)) := cone
({
ej − piijt (ω)e
i
}
1≤i,j≤d
,
{
−ei
}
1≤i≤d
)
,
which we abbreviate as −Kt(ω) := −K(Πt(ω)). In Lemma 3.1 below, we briefly verify the
intuitively obvious fact that the set given in (2.1) coincides with the set L0(−Kt,Ft) of Ft-
measurable selectors of the set-valued mapping ω 7→ −Kt(ω). We use this equality throughout
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the paper and refer to L0(−Kt,Ft) as the set of portfolios attainable from zero endowment at
time t.
Definition 2.1. An Rd-valued adapted process ϑ = (ϑt)
T
t=0 is called self-financing portfolio
process for the bid-ask process (Πt)
T
t=0 if
ϑt − ϑt−1 ∈ L
0(−Kt,Ft) for all t = 0, . . . , T, (2.2)
where ϑ−1 := 0. Consequently, for each pair (s, t) with s, t ∈ {0, . . . , T} and s ≤ t, the convex
cone of hedgeable claims attainable from zero endowment between s and t is denoted by Ats and
is defined to be
Ats :=
t∑
k=s
L0(−Kk,Fk).
For an alternative bid-ask process (Π˜t)
T
t=0, the corresponding set is denoted by A˜
t
s, where −K˜t(ω) :=
−K(Π˜t(ω)) for all ω ∈ Ω and t = 0, . . . , T .
The primary object of interest in this paper is the cone AT0 of hedgeable claims attainable
from zero endowment between 0 and T . However, we still need the following auxiliary notions.
Let Kt(ω) := −(−Kt(ω)) for each ω ∈ Ω, then the convex cone L
0(Kt,Ft) is called the set
of solvent portfolios at time t and the (polyhedral) cone Kt(ω) is called the solvency cone
corresponding to the bid-ask matrix Πt(ω). Indeed, for each portfolio v ∈ L
0(Kt,Ft) the portfolio
−v ∈ L0(−Kt,Ft) is attainable at price zero, thus the portfolio v can be liquidated to zero and,
consequently, is solvent. Similarly, let K0t (ω) := Kt(ω)∩−Kt(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω, then L
0(K0t ,Ft)
denotes the space of portfolios, which are attainable at zero endowment, and vice versa, are
solvent.
Before we introduce our new no-arbitrage condition, we recall the concepts of no-arbitrage
from the literature.
Definition 2.2 (compare to [Sch04] and [KRS03]).
(i) The bid-ask process (Πt)
T
t=0 satisfies the no-arbitrage property (NA) if
AT0 ∩ L
0(Rd+) = {0}. (2.3)
(ii) The bid-ask process (Πt)
T
t=0 satisfies the strict no-arbitrage property (NA
s) if
At0 ∩ L
0(Kt,Ft) ⊆ L
0(K0t ,Ft) for all t = 0, . . . , T. (2.4)
(iii) The bid-ask process (Πt)
T
t=0 satisfies the robust no-arbitrage condition (NA
r) if there is a
bid-ask process (Π˜t)
T
t=0 with smaller bid-ask spreads in the sense that
the spread
[
1
π˜
ji
t (ω)
, piijt (ω)
]
is contained in the relative interior of
[
1
π
ji
t (ω)
, pit
ij(ω)
]
(2.5)
for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ d, t ∈ {0, . . . , T} and almost all ω ∈ Ω, such that (Π˜t)
T
t=0 satisfies the
no-arbitrage condition (NA).
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We just note that in the case of vanishing bid-ask spreads, condition (2.5) is satisfied by the
choice of Π˜ = Π, i.e., frictionless markets are not excluded.
It is well known that although each of the cones L0(−Kt,Ft) is closed with regard to the
convergence in probability, the cone AT0 may fail to be closed. As already mentioned, neither
(NA) nor (NAs) are strong enough to guarantee that AT0 is closed (see Examples 3.1 and 3.3 in
[Sch04]). This is in contrast to the frictionless case, where (NA) is sufficient (see, e.g., Theorem
6.9.2 in [DS06]). In the present context Schachermayer [Sch04] showed that the robust no-
arbitrage condition (NAr) is strong enough to assure that AT0 is closed. We now introduce a
slight weakening of (NAr) called prospective strict no-arbitrage (NAps), which is still sufficient
to guarantee that AT0 is closed.
Definition 2.3. The bid-ask process (Πt)
T
t=0 satisfies the prospective strict no-arbitrage prop-
erty (NAps) if
At0 ∩ (−A
T
t ) ⊆ A
T
t for all t = 0, . . . , T.
Remark 2.4. The (NAps) property has the following interpretation: any claim v ∈ At0 attained
by trading up to time t which can be reduced to the zero portfolio in t or in the subsequent periods,
i.e., −v ∈ ATt , has to be attainable by trading between t and T only, i.e., v ∈ A
T
t . It is a variant
of the (NAs) condition, that postulates that any claim v ∈ At0 which can be liquidated at time t,
i.e., −v ∈ Att, has to be attainable at time t as well, i.e., v ∈ A
t
t. The only difference is that we
do not distinguish between a trade at time t and a trade from which one knows for sure at time t
that it can be realized in the future.
Put differently, for every t, we review the trading up to time t. Either one does not gain
advantage from the trading since the same terminal position can be achieved for sure by starting
to trade at t. Or, one takes some risk by the trading up to time t since the position cannot be
liquidated for sure in the future.
The conditions (NAps) and (NAs) coincide under efficient friction (see Proposition 2.18). We
can already formulate the first main result of the paper:
Theorem 2.5. If the bid-ask process (Πt)
T
t=0 has the prospective strict no-arbitrage property (NA
ps),
then the convex cone AT0 is closed with regard to the convergence in probability.
The theorem above has obvious consequences for the existence of dual variables. For a given
bid-ask matrix Π, the (positive) dual cone K⋆ of the solvency cone K = K(Π) is defined by
K⋆ := {w ∈ Rd : 〈v,w〉 ≥ 0 for all v ∈ K}. For the bid-ask process (Πt)
T
t=0, this induces the set-
valued process (K⋆t )
T
t=0 of dual cones. We can now define the notion of consistent price systems,
which is dual to the notion of self-financing portfolio process and plays a similar role as the
notion of an equivalent martingale measure in the frictionless theory. Once again for a detailed
discussion of the economical interpretation we refer to [Sch04].
Definition 2.6. An adapted Rd+-valued process Z = (Zt)
T
t=0 is called a consistent price sys-
tem (CPS) for the bid-ask process (Πt)
T
t=0 if Z is a martingale under P and Zt ∈ L
0(K⋆t \{0},Ft),
i.e., Zt(ω) ∈ K
⋆
t (ω) \ {0} for a.e. ω ∈ Ω and each t ∈ {0, . . . , T}.
We have the following consequence of Theorem 2.5.
Corollary 2.7. If the bid-ask process (Πt)
T
t=0 satisfies the prospective strict no-arbitrage condi-
tion (NAps), then it admits a consistent price system (CPS). More generally, for any given
strictly positive FT -measurable function ϕ : Ω → (0, 1], there is a CPS Z = (Zt)
T
t=0 with
‖ZT ‖2 ≤Mϕ a.s. for some M ∈ R+ \ {0}, where ‖ · ‖2 denotes the Euclidean norm on R
d.
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Remark 2.8. An abstract version of (NAps) reads: If a strategy up to time t can be extented
to a strategy without losses at T , then any other extension beyond t can be dominated at T by a
strategy that does not trade before t.
This scheme can be formalized in a quite canonical way in diverse market models including,
e.g., capital gains taxes, uncertainty about the execution of limit orders, or dividend paying assets,
where the basic problem from Example 3.1 in Schachermayer [Sch04], can also occur (see, e.g.,
Example 4.5 in [Ku¨h18]). The arguments of our proofs may be adapted to these models to show
that the set of attainable terminal portfolios is closed.
For example, in the context of optimal investment problems with utility functions on the
positive real line, this means, roughly speaking, that the set C of non-negative random variables
dominated by the liquidation value of an attainable portfolio (with a given initial endowment) is
also closed in probability. Hence, defining the set of dual variables D as the polar set of C, the
abstract versions of the duality results in Kramkov and Schachermayer [KS99, Theorem 3.1 and
3.2] may also be applied to these models.
The opposite of Corollary 2.7 fails to be true. More generally, by Example 1 in Section 3.2.4
of [KS09], there cannot exist a no-arbitrage criterion that both guarantees closedness of AT0 and
that is equivalent to the existence of a CPS, cf. also the discussion in Remark 2.13. We can
however establish an equivalence if we pass from (NAps) to a weaker notion of prospective strict
no-arbitrage.
Definition 2.9. The bid-ask process (Πt)
T
t=0 satisfies the weak prospective strict no-arbitrage
property (NAwps) if there is a bid-ask process (Π˜t)
T
t=0 with Π˜t ≤ Πt a.s. for all t = 0, . . . , T , such
that (Π˜t)
T
t=0 satisfies the prospective strict no-arbitrage condition (NA
ps).
The (NAwps) condition is obviously a weakening of the (NAps) condition since the bid-ask
process (Π˜t)
T
t=0 in Definition 2.9 need not be strictly more favorable than (Πt)
T
t=0. The difference
between the two conditions is illustrated in Example 4.2 below, see also Remark 2.13. Our second
main result is the following fundamental theorem of asset pricing.
Theorem 2.10. A bid-ask process (Πt)
T
t=0 satisfies the weak prospective strict no-arbitrage con-
dition (NAwps) if and only if it admits a consistent price system (CPS).
Remark 2.11. Theorem 2.10 extends part 2 of Theorem 1 in Kabanov and Stricker [KS01b] to
the case of infinite probability spaces. Combining these two theorems, it can be seen that (NAwps)
possesses the nice property that it is equivalent to (NA) if |Ω| <∞.
Remark 2.12. In addition, (NA) and (NAwps) coincide in the case of only two assets on
arbitrary probability spaces, which follows from the equivalence of (NA) and the existence of a
CPS, derived by Grigoriev [Gri05].
Remark 2.13. In the following discussion, we identify an “absence of arbitrage” criterion C
with the set of bid-ask processes which satisfy the criterion and call it monotone if for all bid-ask
processes Π˜ ≤ Π, Π˜ ∈ C implies that Π ∈ C. Monotonicity is obviously satisfied by the simple
(NA) condition. The more sophisticated criteria (NAs), (NAr), and (NAps) are in general only
monotone if bid-ask matrices without efficient friction are excluded from the consideration, i.e.,
piijpiji ≥ piijpiji > 1 for all i 6= j. On the one hand, the equivalence to the existence of a CPS can
only hold for a monotone criterion. On the other hand, the closedness of the set of attainable
portfolios does not transfer to a market with a less favorable bid-ask process (see, e.g., Examples
[KS09, Section 3.2.4, Example 1] and [JBW08, Example 2.1]). Thus, to guarantee closedness,
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e.g., in the context of optimal investment problems, the limitation to monotone criteria would
be unnecessarily restrictive.
The (NAwps) criterion can be characterized as the “strongest monotone criterion which is
weaker than (NAps)”, i.e., it follows directly from Definition 2.9 that
(NAwps) =
⋂
(NAps)⊆C, C is monotone
C. (2.6)
In the special case of a frictionless market, the criteria (NAps) and (NAwps) coincide (see Propo-
sition 2.16).
We stress that the picture cannot be as clear-cut as in the frictionless case. In discrete time
frictionless markets, (NA) already implies closedness (see Schachermayer [Sch92]). In contin-
uous time frictionless markets, Delbaen and Schachermayer [DS94] derived closedness in the
appropriate topology under the economic meaningful assumption of “no free lunch with vanish-
ing risk” (NFLVR), that is also necessary for the existence of an equivalent martingale measure.
Under transaction costs, the FTAP of Delbaen and Schachermayer [DS94] cannot hold. Namely,
Example 3.1 in Schachermayer [Sch04] satisfies (NFLVR) defined for multivariate portfolio pro-
cesses, i.e., there does not exist an approximate arbitrage with short positions in any asset
converging uniformly to zero, but a CPS does nevertheless not exist.
The (NAwps) property is not sufficient to assure that AT0 is closed in probability. However,
we have the following obvious consequence of Theorem 2.10.
Corollary 2.14. If a bid-ask process (Πt)
T
t=0 satisfies the weak prospective strict no-arbitrage
condition (NAwps), then we have AT0 ∩ L
0(Rd+) = {0}.
The short proof is also deferred to Section 3.
Remark 2.15. (NAwps) postulates the existence of a bid-ask process (Π˜t)
T
t=0 such that Π˜t ≤ Πt
a.s. for all t = 0, . . . , T and
A˜t0 ∩
(
−A˜Tt
)
⊆ A˜Tt for all t = 0, . . . , T. (2.7)
One may ask if one can replace this condition with the following slightly weaker condition: there
exists a bid-ask process (Π˜t)
T
t=0 satisfying (NA), such that Π˜t ≤ Πt a.s. for all t = 0, . . . , T and
At0 ∩
(
−A˜Tt
)
⊆ A˜Tt for all t = 0, . . . , T (2.8)
Indeed, by Proposition 2.16, (2.7) implies that Π˜ satisfies (NA), which means that the second
condition is a weakening of the first one. In condition (2.8), the position at time t is achieved
by trading in the original market, only its “evaluation” is made in the more favorable market
model Π˜. But, maybe surprisingly, it turns out that (2.8) does not exclude the existence of an
approximate arbitrage and thus a CPS need not exist (see Example 4.3 below).
Proposition 2.16. We have the following implications
(NAr)⇒ (NAps)⇒ (NAwps)⇒ (NA). (2.9)
Remark 2.17. All implications in (2.9) are strict (see Examples 4.1 and 4.2 below; for (NA)
6⇒ (NAwps), consider an arbitrage-free model with an approximate arbitrage, Example 3.1 in
[Sch04], and apply Corollary 2.14).
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Proof of Proposition 2.16. Ad (NAr) ⇒ (NAps). Assume that the bid-ask process (Πt)
T
t=0 sat-
isfies (NAr) and let v ∈ At0 such that −v ∈ A
T
t . We have to show v ∈ A
T
t . According to our
assumption, we have v =
∑t
s=0 ξ˜s with ξ˜s ∈ L
0(−Ks,Fs) for s = 0, . . . , t and −v =
∑T
s=t ξ̂s
with ξ̂s ∈ L
0(−Ks,Fs) for s = t, . . . , T . Hence, we define ξs ∈ L
0(−Ks,Fs) by
ξs :=

ξ˜s, s < t,
ξ˜s + ξ̂s, s = t,
ξ̂s, s > t,
and notice that
∑T
s=0 ξs = v − v = 0. From Lemma 3.2.12 in [KS09], it follows that ξs ∈
L0(K0s ,Fs) for all s = 0, . . . , T . In particular, we have ξ̂s ∈ L
0(Ks,Fs) for s > t. In addition, we
have ξ̂t = −ξ˜t + ξt ∈ L
0(Kt,Ft) + L
0(Kt,Ft) = L
0(Kt,Ft). This implies v =
∑T
s=t(−ξ̂s) ∈ A
T
t ,
which concludes the proof of the first implication.
Ad (NAps) ⇒ (NAwps). Obvious.
Ad (NAwps) ⇒ (NA). Assume that the bid-ask process (Πt)
T
t=0 satisfies (NA
wps), i.e., there
exists a bid-ask process (Π˜t)
T
t=0 with Π˜t ≤ Πt a.s. for all t = 0, . . . , T and (Π˜t)
T
t=0 satisfies
(NAps). Let v ∈ AT0 ∩ L
0(Rd+) ⊆ A˜
T
0 ∩ L
0(Rd+). This obviously implies that −v ∈ L
0(−K˜T ,FT )
and hence, by (NAps) of Π˜, v ∈ L0(−K˜T ,FT ). Together with (−K˜T (ω)) ∩ R
d
+ = {0} for each
ω ∈ Ω, which holds by the properties of a bid-ask matrix, this implies v = 0 a.s. Thus, the
bid-ask process (Πt)
T
t=0 satisfies (NA).
Proposition 2.18. Let the efficient friction (EF) condition hold, i.e.,
K0t (ω) := Kt(ω) ∩ (−Kt (ω)) = {0} for all t = 0, . . . , T and ω ∈ Ω, (EF)
or, equivalently, piijt (ω)pi
ji
t (ω) > 1 for all 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ d, t = 0, . . . , T , and ω ∈ Ω. Then, we have
the equivalence
(NAps)⇔ (NAs). (2.10)
Remark 2.19. In general, (NAs) is neither necessary nor sufficient for (NAps). Indeed, (NAps)
6⇒ (NAs) is straightforward and (NAs) 6⇒ (NAps) follows from Example 3.3 in [Sch04].
But, it is also well-known that under efficient friction (NAr) and (NAs) are equivalent (cf.
Theorem 1 in [KRS02] and Theorem 1.7 in [Sch04]). Thus, in this case (NAr), (NAs), and
(NAps) coincide.
Proof of Proposition 2.18. In view of Proposition 2.16 and the preceding remark, it is sufficient
to show (NAps)⇒(NAs). Hence, we assume that (NAps) holds. Let us show by a backward
induction on t = T, T −1, . . . , 0 that At0∩L
0(Kt,Ft) = {0}. Let t = T and v ∈ A
T
0 ∩L
0(KT ,FT ),
then (NAps) implies v ∈ L0(−KT ,FT ), i.e., v ∈ L
0(KT ∩ (−KT ),FT ), which, under (EF), is
tantamount to v = 0 a.s.
For the induction step t+1 t, we let t < T and assume As0 ∩L
0(Ks,Fs) = {0} for s = t+
1, . . . , T . Given v ∈ At0∩L
0(Kt,Ft), we may write v =
∑T
s=t ξs for ξs ∈ L
0(−Ks,Fs) by (NA
ps).
Since −v ∈ L0(−Kt,Ft) and −v+
∑T−1
s=t ξs = −ξT , we obtain −v+
∑T−1
s=t ξs ∈ A
T
0 ∩L
0(KT ,FT ).
Thus, by the induction hypothesis, −v +
∑T−2
s=t ξs = −ξT−1. Hence, −v +
∑T−2
s=t ξs ∈ A
T−1
0 ∩
L0(KT−1,FT−1) and, again by the induction hypothesis, −v +
∑T−3
s=t ξs = −ξT−2. Continuing
inductively, we get −v + ξt = 0, but this means v ∈ L
0(Kt ∩ (−Kt),Ft) and thus v = 0 a.s. by
(EF).
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Remark 2.20 (Superhedging). With Theorem 2.5, the superhedging result in Schachermayer [Sch04]
(see Theorem 4.1 therein) and its proof hold one-to-one under the slightly weaker assumption that
(Πt)
T
t=0 satisfies (NA
ps) instead of (NAr) – only without the statement with “strictly consistent
price systems” in the brackets.
3 Proofs of the main results
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2.5. The other results of Section 2 are standard
consequences of AT0 being closed and thus we mainly refer to the known results in the literature
and highlight the minor adjustments. The latter is postponed to the end of the section.
The main hurdle in the proof of Theorem 2.5 is that we do not have at hand that the null-
strategies, i.e., the elements of (ξ0, . . . , ξT ) ∈ L
0(−K0,F0)×· · ·×L
0(−KT ,FT ) with
∑T
t=0 ξt = 0
a.s., form a linear space. Namely, it is shown by Rokhlin [Rok08] that the implication
T∑
t=0
ξt = 0 a.s. with ξt ∈ L
0(−Kt,Ft)⇒ ξt ∈ L
0(K0t ,Ft) for all t = 0, . . . , T. (3.1)
is equivalent to (NAr), which is strictly stronger than (NAps). Thus, in the following we propose
a new proof method which overcomes this hurdle.
Before starting with the main proof, we show that L0(−Kt,Ft) coincides with the set given
in (2.1). Later, this allows us to argue directly with orders λ ∈ L0(Rd×d+ ,Ft) and vectors r ∈
L0(Rd+,Ft) instead of the resulting elements of L
0(−Kt,Ft). In order to ease notation, we define
for all t = 0, . . . , T the mapping Lt : L
0(Rd×d+ ,Ft)→ L
0(Rd,Ft) by
Lt(λt) =
∑
1≤i,j≤d
λijt (e
j − piijt e
i) for all λt = (λ
ij
t )1≤i,j≤d ∈ L
0(Rd×d+ ,Ft).
Lemma 3.1. Let Π = (Πt)
T
t=0 denote a bid-ask process. Then, we have
L0(−Kt,Ft) =
{
Lt(λt)− rt | λt ∈ L
0(Rd×d+ ,Ft), rt ∈ L
0(Rd+,Ft)
}
(3.2)
for all t = 0, . . . , T and, consequently, we have
Ats =
{
t∑
k=s
Lk(λk)− r | λk ∈ L
0(Rd×d+ ,Fk), k = s, . . . , t, r ∈ L
0(Rd+,Ft)
}
(3.3)
for all 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T .
Proof. For each λt ∈ L
0(Rd×d+ ,Ft) and rt ∈ L
0(Rd+,Ft) the random vector Lt(λt) − rt is an
element of L0(−Kt,Ft). Hence, we only have to show that for each v ∈ L
0(−Kt,Ft), we can find
λt ∈ L
0(Rd×d+ ,Ft) and rt ∈ L
0(Rd+,Ft) such that v = Lt(λt)− rt a.s.
For this, let v ∈ L0(−Kt,Ft), i.e., v(ω) ∈ −Kt(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω \N , where N ∈ Ft is a set
of measure zero. Then v˜ := 1Ω\Nv ∈ L
0(−Kt,Ft) satisfies v˜ = v a.s. and v˜(ω) ∈ −Kt(ω) for all
ω ∈ Ω. Next, we define the set-valued mapping ω 7→ P (ω) ⊆ Rd×d × Rd by
P (ω) :=
(λ, r) ∈ Rd×d × Rd | λ, r ≥ 0, ∑
1≤i,j≤d
λij
(
ej − piijt (ω)e
i
)
− r = v˜(ω)
 .
10
We have P (ω) 6= ∅ for each ω ∈ Ω by virtue of v˜(ω) ∈ −Kt(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω. In addition, the
mapping ω 7→
∑
1≤i,j≤d λ
ij
(
ej − piijt (ω)e
i
)
− r is Ft-measurable for each (λ, r) ∈ R
d×d
+ × R
d
+,
and the mapping (λ, r) 7→
∑
1≤i,j≤d λ
ij
(
ej − piijt (ω)e
i
)
− r is continuous for each ω ∈ Ω. Hence,
we may apply Theorem 14.36 in [RW09] to find λt ∈ L
0(Rd×d+ ,Ft) and rt ∈ L
0(Rd+,Ft) such that
(λt(ω), rt(ω)) ∈ P (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. This yields v˜(ω) =
∑
1≤i,j≤d λ
ij
t (ω)
(
ej − piijt (ω)e
i
)
− r(ω)
for each ω ∈ Ω and, consequently, we have v = Lt(λt) − rt a.s. At last, (3.3) follows directly
from (3.2).
Definition 3.2. For any t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, we define the (convex) cone of reversible orders at
time t by
Rt := {λ ∈ L
0(Rd×d+ ,Ft) | −Lt(λ) ∈ A
T
t+1}.
The following lemma establishes a suitable decomposition of the elements of L0(Rd×d+ ,Ft)
into reversible and “purely non-reversible” orders. For the decomposition, one needs that Rt is
closed in probability. To achieve this, the lemma assumes that ATt+1 is closed in probability, a
property that is not yet shown at this place.
Lemma 3.3. Let t ∈ {0, . . . , T −1} and assume that ATt+1 is closed in probability. Then for any
λ ∈ L0(Rd×d+ ,Ft) there is a unique pair (up to null sets) λ1 ∈ Rt and λ2 ∈ L
0(Rd×d+ ,Ft) with
λ = λ1 + λ2 such that for any decomposition λ = λ˜1 + λ˜2 with λ˜1 ∈ Rt, λ˜2 ∈ L
0(Rd×d+ ,Ft), we
have
‖λ2‖2 ≤ ‖λ˜2‖2 P-a.s., (3.4)
where the inequality is strict on {λ2 6= λ˜2} P-a.s. and ‖·‖2 denotes the Euclidean norm on R
d×d.
In addition, the mappings pt : L
0(Rd×d+ ,Ft)→ Rt and qt : L
0(Rd×d+ ,Ft)→ L
0(Rd×d+ ,Ft) defined
by pt(λ) = λ1 and qt(λ) = λ2 have the following properties:
(i) For all λ ∈ L0(Rd×d+ ,Ft) and all non-negative Ft-measurable scalars µ we have pt(µλ) =
µpt(λ),
(ii) Image(qt) = {λ ∈ L
0(Rd×d+ ,Ft) | qt(λ) = λ},
(iii) Image(pt) ∩ Image(qt) = {0}.
We refer to pt(λ) and qt(λ) as the reversible and the purely non-reversible part of the or-
der λ ∈ L0(Rd×d+ ,Ft), respectively. The following continuity of the decomposition is the last
ingredient for the proof of Theorem 2.5.
Lemma 3.4. Let t ∈ {0, . . . , T−1} and assume that ATt+1 is closed in probability. Let (λn)n∈N ⊆
L0(Rd×d+ ,Ft) converge P-a.s. to some λ ∈ L
0(Rd×d+ ,Ft). Then, pt(λn) → pt(λ) and qt(λn) →
qt(λ) P-a.s. for n→∞. Especially, Image(qt) is closed in probability.
We postpone the proofs of the two lemmas to make some comments on their use. By the
prospective strict no-arbitrage (NAps) property, reversible orders can be postponed to later
periods s ∈ {t+1, . . . , T}. Thus, any order at time t can be replaced by its purely non-reversible
part at time t. On the other hand, if a sequence in ATt converges, an explosion of the purely
non-reversible orders at time t can be led to a contradiction. The mapping pt plays the role of
the projection of an arbitrary self-financing strategy onto the set of null-strategies in [Sch04].
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There, the null-strategies form a linear subspace, which implies that the orthogonal part is
automatically self-financing. This property is not available here, and thus we cannot argue with
a projection, but with a more complicated decomposition.
Alternatively, the decomposition in Lemma 3.3 could also be defined on the level of portfolio
changes ϑt − ϑt−1 ∈ L
0(Rd,Ft). But, in the proof of Lemma 3.4, we have to argue directly with
the orders λ.
For the convenience of the reader, we recall a lemma on the existence of a measurable
subsequence that is applied several times in the following proofs (see, e.g. [Sch04] and [KS01a]).
Lemma 3.5 (Lemma A.2 of [Sch04]). Let t ∈ {0, . . . , T}. For a sequence (fn)n∈N ⊆ L
0(Rd×d+ ,Ft),
there is a random subsequence (τk)k∈N, i.e., a strictly increasing sequence of N-valued Ft-
measurable random variables such that the sequence of random variables (gk)k∈N given by gk(ω) :=
fτk(ω)(ω), k ∈ N, converges a.s. in the one-point-compactification R
d×d
+ ∪{∞} to a random vari-
able in f ∈ L0(Rd×d+ ∪ {∞},Ft). In fact, we may find the subsequence such that
‖f‖2 = lim sup
n→∞
‖fn‖2, P-a.s.
where ‖∞‖2 =∞.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. First, we show the existence and uniqueness of the decomposition satisfy-
ing (3.4). Fix λ ∈ L0(Rd×d+ ,Ft) and define the non-empty set
Xλ := {λ˜ ∈ Rt | λ− λ˜ ∈ L
0(Rd×d+ ,Ft)},
which consists of the first components of the possible decompositions of λ. Under the assumptions
made, the convex cone Rt is closed in probability and closed under multiplication with non-
negative Ft-measurable scalars. This implies that Xλ is closed in probability and closed under
measurable convex combinations. We have to show that
x := ess inf
λ˜∈Xλ
‖λ− λ˜‖2
is attained and the minimizer is unique. Thus, notice that the set of random variables {‖λ− λ˜‖2 |
λ˜ ∈ Xλ} is downward directed. Indeed, for each λ1, λ2 ∈ Xλ, one has ‖λ − λ3‖2 = ‖λ − λ1‖2 ∧
‖λ− λ2‖2, where
Xλ ∋ λ3 := 1{‖λ−λ1‖2≤‖λ−λ2‖2}λ1 + 1{‖λ−λ1‖2>‖λ−λ2‖2}λ2.
Hence, there is a sequence of random variables (λn)n ⊆ Xλ such that ‖λ − λn‖2 → x P-a.s. for
n → ∞. From the parallelogram law (see, e.g., Lemma 6.51 in [AB06]) of the Euclidean norm
on Rd×d and the convexity of Xλ, we obtain
‖λn − λm‖
2
2 = 2‖λ− λn‖
2
2 + 2‖λ− λm‖
2
2 − 4‖λ −
λn + λm
2
‖22
≤ 2‖λ− λn‖
2
2 + 2‖λ− λm‖
2
2 − 4x P-a.s. (3.5)
(3.5) implies that (λn)n∈N converges P-a.s. to some element of L
0(Rd×d+ ,Ft). By the closedness of
Xλ, one derives the existence. Uniqueness in the postulated sense also follows from the estimate
(3.5).
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This means that the mappings pt and qt are well-defined and it remains to show that they
satisfy the properties.
Ad (i): Let µ ≥ 0 be a Ft-measurable random variable. As a consequence of Rt and
L0(Rd×d+ ,Ft) being closed under multiplication with non-negative Ft-measurable random vari-
ables, we have Xµλ = {µλ˜ | λ˜ ∈ Xλ}. Then, the assertion follows from the construction of pt
from above.
Ad (ii): Let λ ∈ L0(Rd×d+ ,Ft). We have pt(λ) + pt(qt(λ)) ∈ Rt + Rt ⊆ Rt and λ −
(pt(λ) + pt(qt(λ))) = qt(λ)− pt(qt(λ)) ∈ L
0(Rd×d+ ,Ft) by definition of pt, thus in particular
pt(λ) + pt(qt(λ)) ∈ Xλ. (3.6)
On the other hand, one has
‖λ− (pt(λ) + pt(qt(λ))‖2 = ‖qt(λ)− pt(qt(λ))‖2 ≤ ‖qt(λ)‖2 = ‖λ− pt(λ)‖2 P-a.s., (3.7)
where the inequality holds since pt(qt(λ)) is the optimal reversible part of qt(λ). By (3.7), (3.6),
and the uniqueness of the optimal reversible part in the decomposition of λ, it follows that
pt(λ) + pt(qt(λ)) = pt(λ) P-a.s. and thus
Image(pt ◦ qt) = {0}. (3.8)
The assertion immediately follows from (3.8).
Ad (iii): Follows immediately from (ii).
Proof of Lemma 3.4. We have to show that
λn → λ P-a.s. =⇒ pt(λn)→ pt(λ) P-a.s. (3.9)
The property that Image(qt) is closed in probability immediately follows from Lemma 3.3 (ii)
and (3.9) by passing to an almost surely converging subsequence. To show (3.9), we define for
each n ∈ N the Ft-measurable real-valued random variable
µn(ω) := 1 ∧ inf
1≤i,j≤d
pt(λ)
ij(ω)>0
λijn (ω)
pt(λ)
ij(ω)
. (3.10)
One has that µnpt(λ) ∈ Rt and λn − µnpt(λ) ∈ L
0(Rd×d+ ,Ft), i.e., µnpt(λ) ∈ Xλn . This means
that we compress the transfer matrix pt(λ) to use it for a (in general not optimal) decomposition
of λn into a reversible and a non-reversible part. Note that in the trivial case that pt(λ)
ij(ω) = 0
for all (i, j), the compression is irrelevant, here one has µn(ω) = 1. As pt(λn) is the optimal
reversible part of λn, it follows that
‖λn − pt(λn)‖2 ≤ ‖λn − µnpt(λ)‖2 P-a.s. ∀n ∈ N. (3.11)
In addition, by λij ≥ pt(λ)
ij ≥ 0 for all i, j = 1, . . . , d and λn → λ, we have that µn → 1 P-a.s.
Combining this with the triangle inequality of the Euclidean norm, we arrive at
lim sup
n→∞
‖λ− pt(λn)‖2 = lim sup
n→∞
‖λn − pt(λn)‖2 ≤ lim sup
n→∞
‖λn − µnpt(λ)‖2 = ‖λ− pt(λ)‖2 P-a.s.,
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where the inequality follows from (3.11). Since pt(λ) is the optimal reversible part of λ, this just
means that
‖λ− pt(λn)‖2 → ‖λ− pt(λ)‖2, n→∞, P-a.s. (3.12)
To complete the proof, we define the Ft-measurable random variable ε(ω) := sup{1/k | k ∈
N, ‖pt(λn) − pt(λ)‖2(ω) ≥ 1/k for infinitely many n} that is strictly positive on the set A :=
{pt(λn) 6→ pt(λ)} ∈ Ft. Then, we construct the random subsequence (τk)k∈N recursively by
τ0 := 0 and τk := inf{n ∈ N | n > τk−1, ‖pt(λn)− pt(λ)‖2 ≥ ε} on A and τk := k on Ω \ A. By
construction, we have that
P (‖pt(λτk)− pt(λ)‖2 ≥ ε, ∀k ∈ N | A) = 1. (3.13)
By λn → λ and 0 ≤ pt(λn)
ij ≤ λijn , one has supn∈N ‖pt(λn)‖2 ≤ supn∈N ‖λn‖2 <∞ P-a.s. Thus,
by Lemma 3.5, there exists a random subsequence (τ˜k)k∈N of (τk)k∈N and an f ∈ L
0(Rd×d+ ,Ft)
s.t. pt(λτ˜k) → f P-a.s. Together with (3.12), this implies that ‖λ − f‖2 = ‖λ − pt(λ)‖2 P-a.s..
In addition, we have f ∈ Xλ. On the other hand, by (3.13), f 6= pt(λ) on A P-a.s. Since pt(λ)
is the unique optimal reversible part of λ in the sense of Lemma 3.3, these two properties can
only hold simultaneously if P (A) = 0 and we are done.
Remark 3.6. We note that for the proof of Theorem 2.5, we only need the weaker assertion that
Image(qt) is closed in probability. To show this assertion, one can restrict oneself to sequences
with λn = qt(λn), i.e., pt(λn) = 0, for all n ∈ N, and the above proof would already be completed
with (3.12).
We are now in the position to prove Theorem 2.5. As in Kabanov-Ra´sonyi-Stricker [KRS03]
we argue by induction on the periods. The key difference is that reversible orders are postponed
to later periods, instead of being executed and compensated in the same period. The later is not
possible since the null-strategies do not form a linear space.
Proof of Theorem 2.5. Assume that the bid-ask-process (Πt)
T
t=0 satisfies (NA
ps). Let us prove
by a backward induction on t = T, T − 1, . . . , 0 that ATt is closed in probability. The induction
basis t = T is trivial since ATT coincides with L
0(−KT ,FT ) which is closed in probability.
Induction step t+1 t: We assume that ATt+1 is closed in probability for some t ≤ T −1 and
have to show that ATt is closed too. Therefore, let (ξn)n∈N be a sequence in A
T
t which converges
to some ξ ∈ L0(Rd) in probability. Obviously, we may assume that ξn → ξ almost surely by
passing to a subsequence. We have to show that ξ ∈ ATt .
Step 1. According to Lemma 3.1, we may write
ξn =
T∑
s=t
Ls(λ
n
s )− r
n, n ∈ N, (3.14)
where (λns )n∈N ⊆ L
0(Rd×d+ ,Fs) for each s = t, . . . , T and (r
n)n∈N ⊆ L
0(Rd+). Under the induction
hypothesis that ATt+1 is closed in probability, we apply Lemma 3.3 in order to decompose λ
n
t
into pt(λ
n
t ) + qt(λ
n
t ) and thus
Lt(λ
n
t ) = Lt(pt(λ
n
t )) + Lt(qt(λ
n
t )),
where pt(λ
n
t ) is reversible and qt(λ
n
t ) is purely non-reversible. This means that Lt(pt(λ
n
t )) ∈
At0∩(−A
T
t+1). The prospective strict no-arbitrage (NA
ps) property implies that At0∩
(
−ATt+1
)
⊆
14
At+10 ∩
(
−ATt+1
)
⊆ ATt+1 and thus Lt(pt(λ
n
t )) ∈ A
T
t+1. This allows us to rewrite (3.14) as
ξn = Lt(qt(λ
n
t )) + Lt(pt(λ
n
t )) +
T∑
s=t+1
Ls(λ
n
s )− r
n =: Lt(qt(λ
n
t )) + xn
with xn ∈ A
T
t+1. Hence, from now on we can assume w.l.o.g. that (λ
n
t )n∈N ⊆ Image(qt).
Step 2. Our next goal is to show that
P (A) = 0, where A := {lim sup
n→∞
‖λnt ‖2 =∞}. (3.15)
By Lemma 3.5, we may pass to a measurable subsequence (τk)k∈N such that for a.e. ω ∈ A
we have λ
τk(ω)
t (ω) 6= 0 for all k ∈ N and limk→∞ ‖λ
τk(ω)
t (ω)‖2 = ∞. Then, by the stability of
Image(qt) under multiplication with non-negative Ft-measurable scalars (see Lemma 3.3(i)), we
find that λ˜nt :=
λτ
n
t
‖λτnt ‖2
1A belongs to Image(qt) and, in addition, we define
λ˜ns :=
λτns
‖λτnt ‖2
1A ∈ L
0(Rd×d+ ,Fs) for s = t+ 1, . . . , T and r˜
n :=
rn
‖λτnt ‖2
1A ∈ L
0(Rd+).
We have
∑T
s=t Ls(λ˜
n
s )− r˜
n = 1Aξτn/‖λ
τn
t ‖2 → 0 a.s. Now, we may apply once again Lemma 3.5
to find a measurable subsequence (σk)k∈N such that
λ˜t := lim
k→∞
λ˜σkt (3.16)
exists and ‖λ˜t‖2 = lim
k→∞
‖λ˜σkt ‖2. Consequently, Lt(λ˜
σk
t )→ Lt(λ˜t) and thus the sequence(
T∑
s=t+1
Ls(λ˜
σk
s )− r˜
σk
)
k∈N
⊆ ATt+1
converges to −Lt(λ˜t). Since A
T
t+1 is closed and due to Lemma 3.1, the limit can be written as∑T
s=t+1 Ls(λ˜s)− r˜, i.e., we have
Lt(λ˜t) +
T∑
s=t+1
Ls(λ˜s)− r˜ = 0 P-a.s.
with λ˜s ∈ L
0(Rd×d+ ,Fs) and r˜ ∈ L
0(Rd+,Fs). Thus we have that λ˜t is reversible, i.e., λ˜t ∈ Rt =
Image(pt). However, on the other hand, the sequence (λ˜
σk
t )k∈N belonged to Image(qt), thus, by
Lemma 3.4, λ˜t ∈ Image(qt). Therefore λ˜t ∈ Image(pt) ∩ Image(qt), hence λ˜t = 0 a.s. according
to Lemma 3.3 (iii). Since P(A) = P(λ˜t 6= 0), this is only possible if P (A) = 0, i.e., (3.15) holds
true.
Step 3. According to step 2, we can apply Lemma 3.5 to find a measurable subsequence
(τk)k∈N such that λ
τk
t → λt ∈ L
0(Rd×d+ ,Ft) P-a.s. for k →∞ and, consequently, Lt(λ
τk
t )→ Lt(λt)
a.s. Hence,
∑T
s=t+1 Ls(λ
τk
s )−r
τk converges a.s. to ξ−Lt(λt), which, by the induction hypothesis,
belongs to ATt+1. This implies that ξ ∈ A
T
t .
Finally, we finish up the remaining proofs. Notice that every result is a standard consequence
of the set AT0 being closed in probability under the (NA
ps) condition, hence we only give the
respective references and point out where some changes are needed.
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Proof of Corollary 2.7. It suffices to repeat the arguments on page 29 between lines 5-33 of the
proof of Theorem 2.1 in [Sch04] with AT0 (instead of A˜T ), which is closed by Theorem 2.5.
Proof of Theorem 2.10. (NAwps)⇒ ∃ CPS: According to the (NAwps) condition there is a bid-
ask process (Π˜t)
T
t=0 with Π˜t ≤ Πt a.s. for all t = 0, . . . , T satisfying (NA
ps). Corollary 2.7 implies
that (Π˜t)
T
t=0 admits a CPS, which is obviously a CPS for (Πt)
T
t=0 as well.
∃ CPS ⇒ (NAwps): It is again sufficient to repeat the arguments on page 30 between lines
1-12 of the proof of Theorem 2.1 in [Sch04] to define a frictionless bid-ask process (Π˜t)
T
t=0, i.e.,
piijt = 1/pi
ji
t , with Π˜t ≤ Πt a.s. for all t = 0, . . . , T satisfying (NA), which in the frictionless case
coincides with (NAps) by Proposition 2.16. Thus (Πt)
T
t=0 satisfies (NA
wps).
Proof of Corollary 2.14. This is a well known consequence of the existence of a consistent price
system. We may, for example, use Proposition 3.2.6 in [KS09] to see that the existence of a
consistent price system implies AT0 ∩ L
0(KT ,FT ) ⊆ L
0(∂KT ,FT ). To complete the proof, we
observe that ∂KT ∩ R
d
+ = {0}. Indeed, by pi
ij < ∞, the existence of a v ∈ Rd+ \ {0} and a
sequence (vn)n∈N ⊆ R
d \KT (ω)) with vn → v can easily be led to a contradiction.
Remark 3.7. Our results can be extended to the Kabanov model as defined in Subsection 3.2
of [KS09], which, in addition to the barter market considered here, also covers a wider range of
models, e.g., models of a barter market where a bank account is charged the transaction costs
and models where baskets of assets are exchanged. To see this, we briefly highlight the minor
adjustments. On the other hand, the proofs of Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 are heavily based on the
polyhedral structure of the solvency cones. The key argument that µn defined in (3.10) converges
to 1 does not work for general closed solvency cones.
The Kabanov model is defined as follows. Let ((Xit)
T
t=0)i∈N be a sequence of adapted R
d-valued
processes, such that for all t and ω the set {i ∈ N | Xit(ω) 6= 0} is non-empty and finite, and set
−Kt(ω) := cone(X
i
t(ω) | i ∈ N).
In this case, K = (Kt)
T
t=0 defined by Kt(ω) := −(−Kt(ω)) is called a cone-valued process. In
addition, we assume Rd+ \{0} ⊆ intKT (ω) for all ω (which corresponds to the possibility to freely
dispose of assets and piijT < ∞ for all i, j in the base model) and −KT (ω) ∩ R
d
+ = {0} (which
corresponds to piijT ≤ pi
ik
T pi
kj
T and pi
ii
T = 1 for all i, j, k). The cone of hedgeable claims attainable
from zero endowment by trading between s and t is given by Ats =
∑t
k=s L
0(−Kk,Fk), s ≤ t. The
(NA) and (NAps) conditions are defined accordingly. We now sketch how the arguments of the
previous proofs can be applied in this more general setting. Let It(ω) := sup{n ∈ N | X
n
t (ω) 6= 0}
for ω ∈ Ω and t = 0, . . . , T . The assumptions above guarantee that It is a N-valued Ft-measurable
random variable. By Ω =
⋃
I∈N{It = I}, the arguments from Lemmas 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4 can
be separately applied on the sets {It = I} for I ∈ N. In particular, portfolio changes can be
represented by Lt(λt) :=
∑It
i=1 λ
i
tX
i
t , where λ
i
t ∈ L
0(R+,Ft). The Euclidean norm on R
d×d that
is used for the decomposition of an order into the reversible and the purely non-reversible part
is replaced by
‖λ‖2 :=
√√√√ I∑
i=1
(λi)2 on {It = I}.
With these adjustments, Theorem 2.5 extends to the Kabanov model by arguing along the lines
of the original proofs. We note again that it is crucial that for fixed ω, only linear combinations
from finitely many Xit(ω) have to be considered.
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At last, we say that K = (Kt)
T
t=0 satisfies the (NA
wps) property if there is a cone-valued
process K˜ = (K˜t)
T
t=0 with the (NA
ps) property such that Kt(ω) ⊆ K˜t(ω) for all ω and t. Then,
Theorem 2.10 holds true in the Kabanov model as well. Indeed, (NAwps) implies the existence of
a consistent price system for K = (Kt)
T
t=0 and, on the other hand, given a CPS Z = (Zt)
T
t=0,
the cone-valued process K˜ = (K˜t)
T
t=0 defined by K˜t(ω) := (R+Zt(ω))
⋆ satisfies (NAps) and
Kt(ω) ⊆ K˜t(ω) for all t and ω, i.e., K satisfies (NA
wps).
In addition, our reasoning to show the closedness of AT0 can also be applied to models with
incomplete information such as those considered in [Bou06, DVKS07], where arguing on the
level of orders is quite natural.
4 (Counter-)Examples
We start with two very simple examples that illustrate the difference between (NAr), (NAps),
and (NAwps) and the need to consider CPSs which do not lie in the relative interior of the
bid-ask spread.
Example 4.1 ((NAps) 6⇒ (NAr)). We consider a two-asset one-period model with a bank account
that does not pay interest and one stock with bid-price (St)t=0,1 and ask-price (St)t=0,1. The
deterministic prices are illustrated in Figure 1 below. In this special case, a (strictly) consistent
price system corresponds to a pair (S˜,Q) consisting of a measure Q ∼ P and a Q-martingale
S˜ taking its values in (the relative interor of) [S, S]. For more details regarding models with a
bank account see, e.g., Section 3 in [Rok08].
t = 0 t = 1
Price = 1/2
Price = 1
Figure 1: Deterministic model satisfying (NAps) and (NAs), but not (NAr). At t = 0 the bid-
price S0 equals 1/2 and the ask price S0 equals 1; at t = 1 the market is frictionless with price
S1 = S1 = 1.
Obviously, the market admits the unique consistent price process S˜ ≡ 1. S˜ is not a strictly
consistent price process since 1 /∈ (1/2, 1). Hence, the model cannot satisfy (NAr). Also the
Penner-condition, i.e., L0(K0t ,Ft−1) ⊆ L
0(K0t−1,Ft−1) for all t, is not satisfied. On the other
hand, we have that A00 ∩ (−A
1
1) = cone
(
e2 − e1
)
⊆ cone
(
e2 − e1, e1 − e2,−e1,−e2
)
= A11, i.e.,
only a long stock position built up at time 0 can be liquidated without losses at time 1, but the
purchase of the stock (asset 2) can also be postponed to time 1. Thus the model satisfies (NAps).
Example 4.2 ((NAwps) 6⇒ (NAps)). We consider the following variant of Example 4.1:
17
t = 0 t = 1
Price = 1/2
Price = 1
Price = 2
Figure 2: Deterministic model satisfying (NAwps) but not (NAps). One has S0 = 1/2, S0 = 1,
S1 = 1, and S1 = 2.
The market still admits the unique consistent price process S˜ ≡ 1, but now fails (NAps) since
A00 ∩ (−A
1
1) = cone
(
e2 − e1
)
6⊆ cone
(
e2 − 2e1, e1 − e2,−e1,−e2
)
= A11. On the other hand, the
model satisfies (NAwps) since the more favorable bid-ask process in Figure 1 satisfies (NAps).
Finally, we provide an example showing that (NAwps) cannot be replaced by the “next
weaker” condition that there exists a more favorable market, i.e., a bid-ask process (Π˜t)
T
t=0 with
Π˜t ≤ Πt for each t = 0, . . . , T , such that (Π˜t)
T
t=0 satisfies (NA) and
At0 ∩
(
−A˜Tt
)
⊆ A˜Tt for all t = 0, . . . , T (4.1)
(cf. Remark 2.15). We show that there is a bid-ask process (Πt)
3
t=0 with four assets satisfying
condition (4.1) which allows for an approximate arbitrage. Hereby, in the spirit of the basic
Example 3.1 of Schachermayer [Sch04], which can be used to achieve an approximate arbitrage,
the example is based on the idea of two consecutive approximate hedges. There exists a more
favorable bid-ask process (Π˜t)
3
t=0 s.t. (4.1) holds, but which only turns the first approximate
hedge into a perfect hedge and thus the model still satisfies (NA).
The example highlights the importance of a possible “cascade” of approximate hedges, which
is, to the best of our knowledge, a phenomenon not discussed in the previous literature. It is
also of interest for the discussion of adjusted bid-ask processes as introduced in Jacka, Berkaoui,
and Warren [JBW08](see Remark 4.4).
Example 4.3 (A cascade of approximate hedges). Let T = 3, Ω = N2 × {−1/2, 1/2}2, F = 2Ω
and all states have positive probability. In addition, the information structure is given by F0 =
{∅,Ω},
F1 = σ
(
{{(n,m, i, j) | (m, i, j) ∈ N× {−1/2, 1/2}2} | n ∈ N}
)
,
F2 = σ
(
{{(n,m, i,−1/2), (n,m, i, 1/2)} | (n,m, i) ∈ N2 × {−1/2, 1/2}}
)
,
and F3 = 2
Ω = F . This means n is revealed at time 1, m and i are revealed at time 2 and, at
last, j is revealed at time 3. Next, we define a bid-ask process (Πt)
3
t=0 depending on parameter
a > 0 for t = 0, 1 as follows
Π0 =

1 1 1 1
a 1 · ·
a · 1 ·
a · · 1
 , Π1 ≡

1 a a a
a 1 · ·
a · 1 ·
1 · · 1

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and for t = 2, 3 depending on the state (n,m, i, j) ∈ N2 × {−1/2, 1/2}2 as
Π2(n,m, i, j) =

1 a a a
a 1 · ·
1
1+i · 1 ·
1
1− i
n
· · 1
 , Π3(n,m, i, j) =

1 a a a
1
1+ 1
4
+j
1 · ·
1
1+i
1
1− j
m
· 1 ·
a · · 1
 .
The missing entries are specified via the direct transfer over the first asset, i.e., piijt := pi
i1
t pi
1j
t
for 2 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 4. This means that the first asset plays the role of a money market account
and the assets 2,3, and 4 represent risky stocks. Finally, we choose the parameter a prohibitively
high such that the corresponding transfers are unattractive, more precisely, we set a := 5 > 4.
The market is actually frictionless with special short- and long-selling constraints. Asset 2
yields the random return 1/4 + j, j ∈ {−1/2, 1/2}. It can be approximately hedged, yielding
an extra profit, by the return of asset 3 between time 2 and time 3, that reads −j/m. On the
other hand, asset 3 has to be bought already at time 0 which leads to the prior random return i,
i ∈ {−1/2, 1/2}. The latter return can be approximately hedged by asset 4. This means that there
is a cascade of approximate hedges – hedge asset 2 by asset 3 and asset 3 by asset 4 – leading to
an approximate arbitrage.
Step 1. Let us show that (Πt)
3
t=0 allows for an approximate arbitrage, i.e., A
3
0∩L
0(R4+) ) {0}.
Therefore, we define for fixed k ∈ N the following strategy. For t = 0, we set
ξk0 = e
2 − e1 + k(e3 − e1) + k2(e4 − e1) ∈ −K0.
For t = 1, we define
ξk1 (n,m, i, j) =
[
k2 − (k ∧ n) k
] (
e1 − e4
)
∈ −K1(n,m, i, j).
For t = 2, we define
ξk2 (n,m, i, j) =
[
(k ∧ n) k
(
1−
i
n
)](
e1 −
1
1− i
n
e4
)
+
[(
k −
m
1 + i
∧ k
)
(1 + i)
](
e1 −
1
1 + i
e3
)
∈ −K2(n,m, i, j).
Finally, at t = 3 we liquidate the remaining positions in the assets 2 and 3. Thus, we define
ξk3 (n,m, i, j) =
[
1 +
1
4
+ j
](
e1 −
1
1 + 14 + j
e2
)
+
[(
m
1 + i
∧ k
)
(1 + i)
(
1−
j
m
)](
e1 −
1
1 + i
1
1− j
m
e3
)
,
which belongs to −K3(n,m, i, j). Thus v
k = ξk0 + ξ
k
1 + ξ
k
2 + ξ
k
3 belongs to A
T
0 and we have
vk(n,m, i, j) =
[
1
4
+ ik
(
1−
n ∧ k
n
)
+ j
(
1−
1 + i
m
(
m
1 + i
∧ k
))]
e1.
Finally, letting k →∞, we obtain v ∈ AT0 given by
v(n,m, i, j) = lim
k→∞
vk(n,m, i, j) =
e1
4
,
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which is the desired asymptotic arbitrage. Hence, the model cannot admit a CPS (see Proposi-
tion 3.2.6. in [KS09]).
Next, we introduce the bid-ask process (Π˜t)
3
t=0 given by Π˜0 = Π0, Π˜2 = Π2, Π˜3 = Π3, and
Π˜1 ≡

1 a 1 1
a 1 · ·
a · 1 ·
1 · · 1
 ,
which satisfies Π˜t ≤ Πt for all t = 0, 1, 2, 3. We want to show that (Π˜t)
3
t=0 has the (NA) property
and satisfies At0 ∩ −A˜
T
t ⊆ A˜
T
t for t = 0, 1, 2, 3.
Step 2. We start with the (NA) property for (Π˜t)
T
t=0. Let v˜ ∈ A˜
3
0 with v˜
i = 0 for i = 2, 3, 4
and v˜1 ≥ 0 a.s. We have to show that this already implies v˜1 = 0 a.s. We may pass to a v ∈ A˜30
with vi = 0 for i = 2, 3, 4 a.s. and v1 ≥ v˜1 s.t. v can be represented solely by transfers
λ1jt with pi
1j
t < a and λ
j1
t with pi
j1
t < a. (4.2)
Indeed, purchasing an asset i ∈ {2, 3, 4} at price a = 5 or short-selling it at price 1/a = 1/5 (in
terms of the asset 1) leads to a sure loss after liquidating this position afterwards. Hence, we only
need to consider v = ξ0+ ξ1+ ξ2+ ξ3 ∈ A˜
3
0, where ξ0 ∈ cone(e
2 − e1), ξ1 ∈ L
0(cone(e3− e1, e4 −
e1),F1), ξ2 ∈ L
0(cone(e1−pi3,12 e
3, e1−pi4,12 e
4),F2), and ξ3 ∈ L
0(cone(e1−pi2,13 e
2, e1−pi3,13 e
3),F3)
with the additional restrictions ξ31 + ξ
3
2 ≥ 0 a.s. and ξ
4
1 + ξ
4
2 = 0 a.s. Under the assumptions
above, we get
0 ≤ v1(n,m, i, j) ≤ ξ20 · (j + 1/4) + i ·
(
ξ31(n)−
ξ41(n)
n
)
+
(
ξ31(n) + ξ
3
2(n,m, i)
) −j
m
(1 + i) (4.3)
for each state (n,m, i, j) ∈ Ω with ξ20 ≥ 0, ξ
3
1(n) ≥ 0, ξ
3
2(n,m, i) ≤ 0 and ξ
4
1(n) ≥ 0. Hereby
the notation highlights the required measurability of the random variables. We have ξ31(n) +
ξ32(n,m, i) ≤ ξ
3
1(n), i.e., the investment in asset 3 between t = 2 and t = 3 is bounded from
above by the F1-measurable random variable ξ
3
1 . Consequently, the third summand in equation
(4.3) becomes arbitrarily small for large m ∈ N. But, this implies that the sum of the first two
terms, i.e.,
ξ20 · (j + 1/4) + i ·
(
ξ31(n)−
ξ41(n)
n
)
,
that does not depend on m, has to be almost surely non-negative, which is only possible if
ξ20 = 0 and ξ
3
1(n) =
ξ41(n)
n
for each n ∈ N. (4.4)
But then (4.3) reduces to
0 ≤ v1(n,m, i, j) ≤
(
ξ31(n) + ξ
3
2(n,m, i)
) −j
m
(1 + i).
Taking j = 1/2, this implies ξ31(n) = −ξ
3
2(n,m, i) and, consequently, v
1 ≡ 0. Hence (Π˜t)
3
t=0
satisfies (NA).
Step 3. Let us now show At0 ∩ −A˜
T
t ⊆ A˜
T
t for t = 1, 2, 3, 4 (for t = 0, there is nothing to
show). This is akin to the proof in step 2. As in (4.2), we can restrict to portfolios which can be
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represented by transfers that do not trade at price a = 5. Indeed, since we only consider positions
that can be liquidated for sure, the cancellation of a transfer at price a (with re-transfer at a
later time to asset 1), would lead to a strict improvement and thus an arbitrage. Since this would
contradict to the (NA) property of (Π˜t)
3
t=0 shown in Step 2, we can exclude such silly trades in
the following considerations.
By the arguments leading to (4.4), it follows that e2 − e1 6∈ −A˜31. Consequently, we have
A10 ∩ −A˜
3
1 = cone(e
3 − e1, e4 − e1) + L0(cone(e1 − e4),F1) ⊆ A˜
3
1.
Now consider the case t = 2. Let w ∈ A20∩−A˜
3
2, i.e. we may write w = ξ0+ξ1+ξ2 = −ξ˜2− ξ˜3
for ξ0 ∈ cone(e
2−e1, e3−e1, e4−e1), ξ1 ∈ L
0(cone(e4−e1),F1), ξ2, ξ˜2 ∈ L
0(cone(e1−pi312 e
3, e1−
pi412 e
4),F2) and ξ˜3 ∈ L
0(cone(e1 − pi21e2, e1 − pi31e3),F3) with the restrictions ξ
3
0 + ξ
3
2 + ξ˜
3
2 ≥ 0,
ξ40 + ξ
4
1 ≥ 0 and ξ
4
0 + ξ
4
1 + ξ
4
2 + ξ˜
4
2 = 0. Indeed, this is a consequence of (NA) and the avoidance
of silly trades. But, then we may consider v := w−w = ξ0 + ξ1 + ξ2 − (−ξ˜2 − ξ˜3). Note that we
have vi = 0 for i = 2, 3, 4, which uniquely determines v1 as
v1(n,m, i, j) = ξ20 · (j + 1/4) + i ·
(
ξ30 −
ξ40 + ξ
4
1(n)
n
)
+
(
ξ30 + ξ
3
2(n,m, i) + ξ˜
3
2(n,m, i)
) −j
m
(1 + i).
On the other hand, we also have v1 = 0. Since the first two terms do not depend on m ∈ N, we
must have that
ξ20 · (j + 1/4) + i ·
(
ξ30 −
ξ40 + ξ
4
1(n)
n
)
= 0.
Considering j = −1/2 and i = ±1/2, ξ20 ≥ 0 implies that ξ
2
0 = 0 and ξ
3
0−
[
ξ40 + ξ
4
1(n)
]
/n = 0 for
all n ∈ N. Hence, ξ40 = −ξ
4
1(n) for all n ∈ N and ξ
3
0 = 0. Consequently, we also have ξ
3
2(n,m, i) =
ξ˜32(n,m, i) = 0. But, then we have shown w = 0, which is tantamount to A
2
0 ∩−A˜
3
2 = {0} ⊆ A˜
3
2.
The same arguments apply for t = 3 and thus A30 ∩ −A˜
3
3 = {0} ⊆ A˜
3
3.
Remark 4.4. Example 4.3 also allows us to discuss the following related question: Does the
existence of a bid-ask process (Π̂t)
T
t=0 with Π̂t ≤ Πt a.s. for all t = 0, . . . , T such that (Π̂t)
T
t=0
satisfies (NA) and
T∑
t=0
ξt = 0 a.s. with ξt ∈ L
0(−Kt,Ft)⇒ ξt ∈ L
0(K̂0t ,Ft) for all t = 0, . . . , T (4.5)
already imply the absence of an approximate arbitrage, i.e. AT0 ∩ L
0(Rd+) = {0}? Hereby (4.5)
means that each transaction which is involved in a null-strategy in the original model is carried
out at frictionless prices in the adjusted market.
It turns out that the answer to the question is negative. Indeed, in the setting of Example 4.3,
we define the adjusted bid-ask process (Π̂t)
3
t=0 by
Π̂0 =

1 1 1 1
a 1 · ·
a · 1 ·
1 · · 1
 , Π̂1 =

1 a a 1
a 1 · ·
a · 1 ·
1 · · 1
 ,
Π̂2 = Π2 and Π̂3 = Π3. Then, we have Π̂t ≤ Πt a.s. for all t = 0, 1, 2, 3. In addition, the
previously considered adjusted bid-ask process (Π˜t)
3
t=0 satisfies (NA) and yields better terms of
trade than (Π̂t)
3
t=0, i.e., Â
T
0 ⊆ A˜
T
0 . Consequently, (Π̂t)
3
t=0 inherits the (NA) property. In addition,
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the only (up to multiplication with non-negative scalars) null strategy in the original market is
(ϑt−ϑt−1)
3
t=0 = (e
4− e1, e1− e4, 0, 0). Thus, condition (4.5) is satisfied, but, as we have shown,
AT0 ∩ L
0(Rd+) ) {0}.
The key observation is that the bid-ask process (Π̂t)
3
t=0 satisfies (4.5) but not (3.1) since by the
extension of the market from (Πt)
3
t=0 to (Π̂t)
3
t=0 new null-strategies occur. Indeed, it was a finding
by Jacka, Berkaoui, and Warren [JBW08] (see the paragraph before Definition 3.2 therein)
that it is not sufficient that the null-strategies in the original market are frictionless in the
market extended by their “adjusted trading prices”, i.e., it is not sufficient that (4.5) is satisfied.
However, in their Example 3.3 with T = 1, a price adjustment Π̂ such that (4.5) holds true turns
out to be sufficient to obtain a closed set of attainable portfolio values (indeed, in Example 3.3
of [JBW08], the price adjustment essentially consists of adding L0(cone(e1 − e2),F1), which is
already necessary to make the null-strategy (e1 − e2, e2 − e1) = (e2 − e1, e4/ω − e1 + e3/ω −
e4/ω+e2−e3/ω) of the original market frictionless in the extended market). On the other hand,
Example 4.3 highlights why in the approach of [JBW08] it would not be sufficient to ensure that
the null-strategies in the original market are frictionless in the extended market.
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